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Yuliya Rychalovská  Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy
in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy
Yuliya Rychalovska ￿
Abstract
The paper analyzes the stabilization objectives of optimal monetary policy and the trade-offs fac-
ing the central bank in a two-sector small open economy model obtained as a limiting case of a
two-country DSGE framework. We introduce a more complicated economic structure, namely,
multiple domestic sectors combined with a variety of exogenous shocks. In addition, our model
includes a more general speci￿cation of consumers’ preferences than has been considered in the
literature so far. As a result, we are able to uncover additional welfare effects speci￿c to the open
multi-sectoral economy and make a methodological contribution by deriving a utility-based wel-
fare measure and the optimal reaction function of the central bank. We show that the optimal
targeting rule is represented by a complex expression that prescribes the response to the appropri-
ate measure of domestic in￿ation, sectoral output gaps, as well as to the relevant relative prices.
We demonstrate that our model generates an endogenous con￿ict between the objectives of do-
mestic in￿ation and real exchange rate stabilization in addition to the in￿ation-output gap policy
trade-off common in the literature. Furthermore, we experiment with alternative simple rules and
analyze their ability to replicate the optimal solution.
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Nontechnical Summary
In recent decades the approach to monetary policy conduct has shifted to a more systematic one. Many
central banks have formulated their policy objectives explicitly and, more speci￿cally, have announced
their commitment to price stabilization as the overriding policy goal. As a result, a new operational
framework, i.e., in￿ation targeting, has been introduced by the most advanced central banks.
Therelateddiscussioninacademiahasbeenevolvingaroundtheissueofwhetherstrictin￿ationtargeting
indeed represents the best strategy from the welfare viewpoint. In other words, researchers attempt to
de￿ne the set of appropriate monetary policy objectives that maximize social welfare. Such an analysis
has been performed for different economic models. One thread in the literature derives optimal policy
under assumed welfare objectives. In particular, the loss function usually takes the quadratic form with
terms such as in￿ation (CPI or domestic) and the output gap, with weights chosen ad hoc. This approach
is very popular in applied research because it greatly simpli￿es the derivations and brings the model
dynamics closer to the real data. At the same time, such an approach assumes certain policy objectives
a priori. An alternative methodology analyzes optimal monetary policy on the basis of the objective
function of the central bank, which is derived from micro-foundations.
Thispapercontributestothesecondclassofliterature. Weanalyzepolicyobjectivesthatareoptimalfrom
the welfare perspective of a small open economy with a traded and non-traded sector. More speci￿cally,
our work adds to the normative analysis of open economies by introducing a more complicated economic
structure, namely, multiple domestic sectors, combined with a variety of domestic (sector-speci￿c) and
foreign shocks. In addition, the general speci￿cation of consumers’ preferences (non-unitary elasticity
of substitution) is considered. We assess the role of structural asymmetries and multiple relative prices
for monetary policy design and welfare evaluation. We derive a utility-based welfare measure and the
optimal reaction function of the central bank. For this purpose, linear-quadratic solution methods, which
involve computation of a second-order approximation of the utility function and the model structural
equations, are employed. This approach enables us to analyze the determinants of optimal monetary
policy and rank alternative monetary policy regimes on the basis of a rigorous welfare measure derived
from micro-foundations and approximated by a tractable quadratic form.
We ￿nd that differentiating production between traded and non-traded goods in an open economy brings
sector-speci￿c features into the formulation of social welfare objectives. In addition, the loss function
containsanopeneconomyterm, i.e., theexchangerate. Therefore, forourmodelspeci￿cation, themicro-
founded stabilization goals differ from their ad hoc counterparts assumed in the literature. We show that
the optimal targeting rule is represented by a complex expression that prescribes the response to the
appropriate measure of domestic in￿ation, sectoral output gaps, as well as to the relevant relative prices,
i.e., the exchange rate and the relative price of non-traded goods. Taking into account the complexity
of the optimal reaction function, we found it practically important to experiment with alternative simple
rules and analyze their ability to replicate the optimal solution. Our numerical results suggest that the
type of shock is an important determinant of the comparative performance of optimal versus simple
policy rules. Speci￿cally, the optimal response differs the most from the simple rules under ￿scal and
mark-up shocks. In general, we draw the conclusion that strict targeting of domestic and CPI in￿ation
is not the best approximation for the optimal policy. The reason for such a result is that the optimal
policy prescribes a different magnitude of response to changes in home and non-traded in￿ation rates.
Therefore, targeting domestic in￿ation, which aggregates sector-speci￿c in￿ations into one variable, is
suboptimal. In addition, the social welfare objectives imply a certain degree of output gap and exchangeWelfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 3
rate management. The poor performance of CPI targeting can be explained by the excessive smoothness
of relative prices which this regime entails.
Furthermore, we rank a set of alternative simple rules according to the derived welfare measure and
demonstrate that welfare loss can be reduced by accounting for policy objectives other than in￿ation,
namely, the output gap and the exchange rate. We also evaluate the bene￿ts of targeting sector-speci￿c
versus aggregate variables. In addition, we ￿nd that inclusion of the exchange rate in the targeting rule
may contribute to welfare improvements when the central bank does not have enough information about
the sector-speci￿c variables. Generally, the simple rules perform quite well in terms of macroeconomic
stabilization and can deliver reasonable welfare results. Finally, the analysis of macroeconomic volatility
under the simple rules demonstrates that our model generates tension between the objectives of domestic
in￿ation and real exchange rate stabilization in addition to the in￿ation-output gap policy trade-off com-
mon in the literature. Such an analysis may be of practical importance prior to entering the Eurozone,
when the monetary authority has to ful￿ll several (sometimes con￿icting) stabilization objectives.
In this paper we analyzed the optimal monetary policy for a model with a more complex, yet more real-
istic, economic structure. However, the model remains quite stylized and represents a rather simpli￿ed
view of the real world. The results are based on a set of assumptions such as Calvo-type price setting,
rationality of agents, absence of uncertainties and adjustment costs, etc. Therefore, our analysis may
provide rather restricted normative conclusions. Keeping this caveat in mind, we believe, however, that
the micro-founded approach enables us to deepen the understanding of the mechanisms and incentives
that arise in the real economy and thus to improve policy recommendations.4 Yuliya Rychalovska
1. Introduction
In the world of dynamic interactions between economies through international trade, should policymak-
ers account for various country-speci￿c features when implementing monetary strategy, or should they
assume that welfare can be maximized under the uniform speci￿cation of the policy objectives? In other
words, to what extent are the appropriate monetary policy targets endogenous to speci￿c characteristics
such as country size, degree of openness, asymmetric economic and trading structure, and the level of
development across countries? This paper aims to contribute to the discussion of these crucial issues of
monetary policy design and practical implementation.
The importance of taking a systematic approach to the conduct of monetary policy, featuring explicit
formulation of policy objectives, has been rising in recent decades. Price stability has been recognized
as the overriding policy goal by many monetary institutions worldwide. As a result, a new operational
framework has been introduced by the most advanced central banks in order to match the of￿cially stated
goals of macroeconomic stabilization with their practical realization. In￿ation targeting, which implies
a quantitative speci￿cation of the desired level of in￿ation, has gained a reputation as being a strategy
capable of generating stable and non-in￿ationary growth, thus strengthening the policy credibility and
reputation of the monetary authority.
However, important features of modern economies, such as the social and economic consequences of
unemployment, uncertainties of various types, asymmetric economic structure, and interrelations with
the rest of the world, have brought about efforts to widen the range of policy objectives beyond in￿ation
(price) stability alone. Therefore, over the past several years, the attention of leading economists has
turned to the issue of formal characterization of the proper monetary policy objectives. These concerns
have spurred a variety of research attempting to shed some light on the question of whether strict in￿ation
targeting indeed represents the optimal monetary policy from the welfare viewpoint. Addressing this
topic is the most challenging when analyzing open economy models, where the formulation of policy
targets appears to be more controversial compared to a closed economy setting.
The central issue in the literature on open economies is the assessment of the implications of openness
for the formulation of the central bank’s policy objectives and welfare analysis. In other words, the
underlying questions are whether the central bank should also target open economy variables, i.e., the
exchange rate, and how the targeting of domestic variables changes under the exposure of the economy
to external factors. Answering these questions involves studying the conditions under which the open
economy problem is not isomorphic to the closed economy model speci￿cation. Another topic which has
attracted a great deal of attention from both researchers and practitioners is related to the determination
of the appropriate in￿ation measure that has to be stabilized.
The problem of formal welfare analysis and characterization of optimal monetary policy rules for dif-
ferent economic models has been addressed in a number of studies. It has been shown that welfare-
maximizing monetary policy in a closed economy should aim to stabilize both CPI in￿ation and the
output gap. Woodford (2003) derives the corresponding loss function from the utility of the represen-
tative household. In studies of open economies, ranking of alternative monetary regimes and policy
rules has been extensively performed on the basis of ad hoc objective functions or, alternatively, welfare
representations derived for closed economy models.
A surprising conclusion drawn by several authors who have performed explicit welfare derivation for
models of open economies is that exchange rate ￿uctuations have no direct impact on welfare. Speci￿-
cally, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) ￿nd that under perfect exchange rate pass-through, the qualitativeWelfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 5
results for the closed economy carry over to the open economy. Gali and Monacelli (2005), who charac-
terize the welfare of a small open economy for a special case of parameter values and under the balanced
trade assumption, support the previous result and conclude that the small open economy problem is
identical to that of a closed economy. The above results taken at face value imply optimality of complete
exchange rate ￿exibility.
However, a number of recent studies have challenged this ￿nding. Speci￿cally, Corsetti and Pesenti
(2005), Sutherland (2002), and Monacelli (2003) show that under incomplete pass-through, optimal
policy is not purely inward looking. Benigno and Benigno (2006) analyze the gains from international
monetarypolicycooperation. Theystudytheconditionsunderwhichindividualcountrieshaveincentives
to in￿uence the terms of trade and thus to deviate from the socially optimal point. De Paoli (2006) ￿nds
that the simple violation of purchasing power parity (PPP) which arises from home bias in consumption
brings in a role for targeting the real exchange rate in a one-sector small open economy model. Liu
and Pappa (2005) consider a two-sector open economy model in a two-country framework. Their study
provides interesting insights into the impact of asymmetric structure between sectors on the gains from
cooperation. Their results suggest that in an economy with multiple sectors, and thus multiple sources of
nominal rigidities, optimal monetary policy cannot replicate a ￿exible price allocation creating the scope
for coordination. The important limitation of their work for the analysis of optimal monetary policy is
the assumption of unitary elasticity of substitution across goods and a logarithmic utility function. As a
result, under this very special case important welfare effects vanish and general conclusions concerning
the optimal monetary policy cannot be derived.
The theoretical contributions discussed above mainly address the issue of the optimal monetary policy in
stylized model frameworks that are derived from micro-foundations, but, at the same time, they represent
rather a simpli￿ed view of the real economy. Factors such as uncertainties, transmission mechanism
lags, adjustment costs, and other country-speci￿c characteristics are dif￿cult to take into account in this
class of models. Therefore, an alternative methodological approach, which allows the incorporation
of more realistic features of real economies into the model, is now widely used in the literature and
practice of central banks. This approach implies the derivation of the optimal policy rules on the basis
of reduced-form model equations and an ad-hoc welfare function. Among the relevant contributions in
the ￿eld is the paper by HlØdik (2003), who investigates the second-round effects of selected supply-
side shocks and of shocks to the nominal exchange rate on wages and in￿ation. The author analyzes
the optimal reaction of the central bank to these shocks and derives the optimal policy rules within the
New-Keynesian framework. The reduced form approach employed in this paper allows us to incorporate
a realistic (for the Czech economy) speci￿cation of wage contracts, to account for the delayed effects
of monetary policy, and to include backward-looking components into the model. Consequently, the
dynamics of the model are more realistic, which makes the results of such an analysis and the approach
in general extremely useful for practical purposes.
Our work aims to analyze the stabilization objectives of optimal monetary policy and the trade-offs
facing the central bank in a two-sector small open economy model obtained as a limiting case of a two-
country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium framework. We assess the role of general preferences,
structural asymmetries, and multiple relative prices for monetary policy design and welfare evaluation.
Speci￿cally, we aim to contribute to the normative analysis of open economies by introducing a more
complicated economic structure, namely, multiple domestic sectors combined with a variety of sector-
speci￿c and foreign shocks. In addition, we consider a general speci￿cation of preferences. These
features of the model differentiate our work from the previous studies, which derived their results for
the special cases of unitary elasticity of substitution across goods or, alternatively, relied on the ad hoc6 Yuliya Rychalovska
objective functions and welfare representations obtained for closed economy models. By abstracting
from those simplifying assumptions we are able to uncover additional welfare effects speci￿c to the open
multisectoral economy and make a methodological contribution by deriving the utility-based welfare
measure and the optimal reaction function of the central bank under more generalized preferences. For
this purpose we employ the linear-quadratic solution methods discussed in Benigno and Benigno (2006)
and Benigno and Woodford (2005), which involve computation of a second-order approximation of the
model structural equations. This approach enables us to analyze the determinants of optimal monetary
policy and rank alternative monetary policy regimes on the basis of a rigorous welfare measure derived
from micro foundations and approximated by a tractable quadratic form.
The results of our study support the conclusion drawn by Benigno and Benigno (2006) and De Paoli
(2006) that the optimal monetary policy for an open economy, in general, is not isomorphic to the one
prescribed for the closed economy. Unlike the contributions mentioned above, our ￿ndings are deter-
mined by a multisectoral economic structure and, in particular, by the various sensitivities of the domes-
tic sectors to exogenous shocks. We ￿nd that differentiating production between traded and non-traded
goods in the open economy generates important implications for optimal policy and welfare. While in
the closed economy setting the best strategy is determined purely by structural characteristics such as
sector size or degree of nominal rigidities, the open economy formulation implies, in addition, open-
ness to trade of one of the domestic segments. Such a qualitative difference between sectors determines
their asymmetric response to exogenous shocks (even of identical magnitude) and brings sector-speci￿c
features into the formulation of stabilization objectives.
Moreover, our model representation provides important insights into the relevant policy trade-offs. In
particular, we show that introducing the non-traded sector into the setup with general preferences allows
modeling of the endogenous con￿ict between the objectives of in￿ation and exchange rate stabilization in
additiontothein￿ation-outputgappolicytrade-offcommonintheliterature. Wewouldliketoemphasize
that under the special case of unitary elasticity of substitution and logarithmic utility, as in the two-sector
model by Liu Pappa (2005), only the standard in￿ation-output gap trade-off can be generated. Thus
the crucial role of multiple relative prices in modeling another empirically appealing policy challenge
disappears. Furthermore, we derive the optimal targeting rule, which determines the variables (targets)
to which the central bank should respond in order to achieve ef￿cient allocation of resources, as well as
the magnitude of such a response. We show that the optimal targeting rule is represented by a complex
expression that involves backward and forward-looking components. In general, the rule prescribes the
response of the central bank to the appropriately speci￿ed measure of domestic in￿ation, sectoral output
gaps, as well as to the relevant relative prices, i.e., the exchange rate and the relative price of non-traded
goods.
Finally, we experiment with alternative simple rules and analyze their ability to replicate the optimal so-
lution. Such an exercise enables us to explicitly demonstrate and numerically evaluate policy trade-offs
in terms of macroeconomic volatility. Our results suggest that targeting domestic in￿ation is not always
the best approximation for the optimal policy, and social welfare can be improved by accounting for
other policy objectives, namely, the output gap and the exchange rate. We present a ranking of alter-
native simple rules, which indicates the costs of implementing alternative monetary strategies and can
provide useful information for managing the con￿icting policy objectives. We show that the simple rules
which stabilize sector-speci￿c variables can be closely replicated by rules that respond to the aggregate
output gap and the exchange rate with the appropriate decomposition of weights. Such a result is impor-
tant because a strategy which differentiates the response between domestic sectors is dif￿cult to design
and implement in practice. Generally, the simple rules perform quite well in terms of macroeconomic
stabilization (relative to the optimal rule) and can deliver reasonable welfare results.Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and section 3 describes the equilibrium
dynamics. Section 4 analyzes the monetary policy problem and welfare. Section 5 describes the results
of the numerical simulation. Section 6 illustrates the welfare implications of alternative simple rules.
Finally, the results of the paper are summarized in section 7.
2. A two-Sector Small Open Economy Model
The framework is represented by a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model where both sides,
Home(theopeneconomy￿H)andForeign(therestoftheworld, therelativelyclosedeconomy￿F), are
explicitly modeled. The small open economy problem is derived as a limiting case of such a framework
(as in De Paoli, 2006). Each country has two domestic sectors, which produce traded and non-traded
goods; the share of non-traded goods may vary in the consumption basket of each country. A continuum
of in￿nitively lived households consumes the ￿nal consumption good, which includes goods produced in
both domestic sectors as well as imported goods. Households produce differentiated intermediate goods
and receive disutility from production. We introduce monopolistic distortion and sticky prices in both
sectors. These assumptions represent the standard way of introducing the role for monetary policy into
such class of models. Households as consumers maximize their utility and solve the optimal price-setting
problem as producers.
The model speci￿cation allows us to consider the closed economy, the open one-sector economy, and
the economy with unitary elasticity of substitution as special cases of our more general analysis. We
assume sector-speci￿c productivity, ￿scal, and mark-up shocks; the degree of nominal rigidities may also
differ across sectors. Furthermore, we assume production subsidies in order to offset the monopolistic
distortions in both sectors. The international and domestic asset markets are complete.
2.1 Representative Households
In our two-country framework a continuum of domestic households belong to the interval [0;n), while
foreign agents belong to the segment (n;1]. The utility function of a representative consumer in country








s) ￿ V (ys;T(j);Ai
s;T) ￿ V (ys;N(j);Ai
s;N)]
)
where j is the index speci￿c to the household, and i is the country index; Et denotes the expectation
operator conditional on the information set at time t, and ￿ is the intertemporal discount factor. U(.)
represents the ￿ows of utility from consumption of a composite good and V (:) stands for the ￿ows of
disutility from production of differentiated goods. Each household produces two types of differentiated
goods ￿ traded and non-traded. The home economy produces a continuum of differentiated traded goods
indexed on the interval [0;n], whereas the foreign economy’s traded goods belong to the interval (n;1].
In addition, a continuum of differentiated non-traded goods are indexed on the interval [0;n] and (n;1]
for the home and foreign country, respectively. A denotes a productivity shock that can be country and
sector speci￿c. The subscript T stands for the traded sector, whereas N denotes the non-traded sector.












where L = H;N; ￿ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
and ￿ ￿ 0 is equivalent to the inverse of the elasticity of goods production. The composite consumption
















where CN and CT are the consumption sub-indexes that refer to the consumption of non-traded and
traded goods, respectively, ! > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, and ￿ is a preference
parameter that measures the relative weight that individuals put on non-traded goods.
















where the asterisk denotes a foreign country variable.































where ￿ and ￿￿ are the parameters that determine the preferences of agents in countries H and F,
respectively, for the consumption of goods produced at Home.
As in Sutherland (2002) and De Paoli (2006) we assume that ￿￿, the share of imported goods from
country H in the consumption basket of country F, increases proportionally to the relative size of the
home economy n and the degree of openness e ￿￿. Thus we assume that ￿￿ = n￿e ￿￿. Similarly, (1￿￿) =
(1 ￿ n) ￿ e ￿￿. Such a speci￿cation allows modeling of home bias in consumption as a consequence of
different country size and degree of openness.
The consumption sub-indexes of non-traded, home-produced, and foreign-produced differentiated goods















































































































where ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated goods.Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 9
The corresponding consumption-based price indexes for countries H and F take the form:
P = [￿P1￿!












































































































where pN(z);pH(z); and pF(z) are prices in units of the domestic currency of the home-produced non-
traded and traded goods, and foreign-produced goods. The law of one price holds for differentiated
goods, i.e., ph(z) = S ￿ p￿
h(z) and pf(z) = S ￿ p￿
f(z), where S is the nominal exchange rate, de￿ned as
the price of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency. This in turn implies that PH = S￿P￿
H
and PF = S￿P￿
F. However, equations (1) and (2) demonstrate that the presence of non-traded goods and
the home bias in consumption result in violation of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), i.e., P 6= S ￿P￿.
Thus the real exchange rate is not equal to one and is de￿ned as ER = S￿P￿
P . The real exchange rate
determinants will be more explicitly analyzed in subsection 2.5.
2.2 Aggregate Demand
By solving the consumer’s cost minimization problem we derive the total demand for the differentiated
goods produced in countries H and F as well as the demand for the non-traded goods in both countries.
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where G and G￿ are country and sector-speci￿c government purchase shocks, PFH = PF
PH is the relative
price of foreign to home-produced goods, i.e., the terms of trade, and ER is the real exchange rate.
In order to obtain the small open economy version of our general two-country framework we apply the
assumptions ￿￿ = n￿e ￿￿ and (1￿￿) = (1￿n)￿e ￿￿ and take the limit n ! 0 similar to De Paoli (2006).































































Therefore, the demand side for our two-sector small open economy model is represented by equations
(4), (6), (7), and (8).
The demand equations illustrate the small open economy implications, the impact of the economic struc-
ture, and a more general speci￿cation of preferences. In particular, the demand for goods produced at
Home depends on both domestic and foreign consumption, whereas the demand for foreign-produced
goods is not affected by changes in Home consumption. Moreover, the two-sector model speci￿cation
brings in the differentiated impact of the terms of trade and the real exchange rate on the total demand
for tradable goods. This happens under the general assumption that ￿ 6= !: The literature on open
economies usually assumes that ￿ > ! , ￿ > 1, and ! is small. This implies that non-traded and traded
goods are complements in the consumption basket. At the same time, home and foreign-produced goods
are considered as substitutes.
2.3 International Risk Sharing
Foreign and domestic households have access to the international ￿nancial market, where state-
contingent nominal bonds are traded. Households at home and abroad make their optimal consumption-
savingdecisions. Theymaximizetheirutilitysubjecttothesequenceofbudgetconstraintsfort = 0;1;:::
PtCt + EtDt;t+1Bt+1 ￿ Bt + ￿t + TtWelfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 11
where Bt+1 is the holding of a nominal state-contingent bond that pays one unit of home currency in
period t+1, Dt;t+1 is the period t price of the bond, ￿t is the pro￿t income from goods production, and
Tt is the transfer from the government. The complete-market assumption implies that the marginal rate

















The international risk-sharing equation presented above illustrates the equality of nominal wealth in both
countries in all states and time periods. The violation of PPP implies that ￿uctuations in the real exchange
rate may result in divergence in consumption across countries even under optimal risk sharing.
2.4 Optimal Pricing Decisions
Each household is a monopolistic producer of one differentiated traded and one non-traded good. The
domestic household sets the price pN(z) and ph(z) and takes as given P, PN, PH, PF, and C. The
price-setting behavior is modeled according to Calvo (1983). In countries H and F in each time period a
fraction ￿L 2 [0;1) of randomly picked producers in each sector (L = N;H) are not allowed to change
their prices. Thus the parameter ￿L re￿ects the level of price stickiness. The remaining fraction (1￿￿L)








(1 ￿ ￿S)e pt;L(z)e yt;S;L(z) ￿ V (e yt;S;L(z);AS;L)
￿
where after-tax revenues in each sector are evaluated using the marginal utility of nominal income,
UC(CS)
PS ; which is identical for all households in the country under the assumption of complete mar-
kets; ￿S is the tax rate; e pt;L(z) is the price of the differentiated good z, which is produced in sector L,
chosen at time t , and e yt;S;L(z) is the total demand for good z, produced in sector L, at time S, condi-
tional on the fact that the price e pt;L(z) has not been changed. All producers who belong to the fraction
(1 ￿ ￿L) choose the same price.














where ￿S;L = ￿
(1￿￿S;L)(￿￿1) represents the overall degree of monopolistic distortion and leads to an
inef￿cient gap between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility of production.
Benigno and Benigno (2006) and De Paoli (2006) refer to this gap as the mark-up shock. Calvo-type
setting implies the following law of motion for the sectoral price indexes:
PL;t = [￿L(PL;t￿1)1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿L)e pt;L(z)1￿￿]
1
1￿￿ (11)
Similar conditions can be derived for the producers in country F.12 Yuliya Rychalovska
2.5 Real Exchange Rate Decomposition and PPP Violation
In order to explore the structural economic factors that result in PPP violation, we consider the real
exchange rate decomposition. The real exchange rate is de￿ned as ER = S￿P￿
P . We use the price indexes
(1), (1a), (2), and (2a) to express the real exchange rate as a function of relative prices and preference
parameters. We also use the fact that the law of one price holds for tradable goods, i.e., PH = S ￿ P￿
H
and PF = S ￿ P￿
F. The real exchange rate can be presented as:
ER =
￿
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿￿)(PFH)1￿￿




NT)1￿! + (1 ￿ ￿￿)











the relative prices of non-traded goods in the two countries. Such a decomposition enables us to analyze
the different channels of PPP violation. First of all, we note that under ￿ 6= ￿￿;the ER is affected by the
terms of trade. For our small open economy model speci￿cation, given the assumptions on ￿ and ￿￿; the
difference in country size necessarily results in different shares of consumption of home-produced goods
in countries H and F. This so-called home bias channel has also been analyzed by De Paoli (2006) and
Sutherland (2002).
Another important component that explains the deviation of the ER from PPP is determined by the mul-
tisectoral economic structure. Speci￿cally, different preferences for consumption of non-traded goods
across countries, i.e., ￿ 6= ￿￿; as well as changes in the relative price of non-traded goods determine the
￿uctuation in the ER. The divergence in relative prices may occur as a result of country or sector-speci￿c
productivity shocks. Moreover, the law of one price holds for traded goods only. Nothing can ensure that
the same equality will hold for the goods produced in the non-traded sector. Therefore, the exchange rate
in our model is a composite term of two types of relative prices. As far as the policy issues are concerned,
such a distinction implies more a dif￿cult task of exchange rate management.
3. Equilibrium Dynamics









F; the allocations yd
t;H(z) and price e pt;H(z) for traded goods produced in the domestic economy, and
yd





F;t, that satisfy the following equilibrium conditions:
1. taking prices as given, the household’s allocation in each country solves the consumer’s utility
maximization problem;
2. taking aggregate prices as given, the demand allocations and the price of each non-traded differ-
entiated good solve the producer’s pro￿t maximization problem;
3. taking aggregate prices as given, the demand allocations and the price of each traded differentiated
good solve the producer’s pro￿t maximization problem;
4. the world bond market clears.Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 13
3.1 Sticky Price Equilibrium
The equilibrium dynamics under sticky prices are characterized by the optimality conditions derived
in section 2. Here we present a log-linearized version of the model. We de￿ne b xt ￿ ln xt
x as the log






represents the log deviation of the equilibrium variable xt under ￿exible prices from its steady state
value. Under the assumption of ￿exible prices, producers can re-optimize every period so that their
pricing decisions are synchronized. As a result the price dispersion among the differentiated goods is
zero. Therefore, the price index in each sector is equal to the price set by each producer in this sector and
the main source of domestic distortion is eliminated. We will refer to b xt ￿ b xt
flex as the deviation of the
variable b xt from its natural level, i.e., the gap. At the same time, Benigno and Woodford (2005) and De
Paoli (2006) demonstrate that under certain conditions, the ￿exible price equilibrium does not represent
the most ef￿cient allocation of resources, and the desired levels of variables which the policymaker
wishes to achieve in order to eliminate the loss may differ from the ￿exible price allocation. Speci￿cally,
in the presence of mark-up and ￿scal shocks as well as the condition ￿￿ 6= 1, the ￿exible price allocation
diverges from the desired targets. Therefore, in general, the optimal policy aims at stabilization of the
variables relative to their target level. Thus, we de￿ne the welfare relevant gap as b xt ￿ b xt
T, where
b xt
T is the target level of the variable b xt. Both the ￿exible price equilibrium and the target variables are
functions of shocks that affect the economy.
Moreover, we de￿ne the price change in the traded sector as ￿H =
PH;t
PH;t￿1; and that in the non-traded
sector as ￿￿N =
PN;t
PN;t￿1; consequently, the producer price in￿ation rates in the traded and non-traded











3.1.1 The Steady State
We approximate the model around the steady state, in which AN = AH = 1; G = 0, ￿H ￿ 1, ￿N ￿ 1.
We assume that producer prices do not change in the steady state, i.e., ￿H =
PH;t
PH;t￿1 = 1 and ￿N =
PN;t
















we obtain the steady state real exchange rate equal to unity, i.e., ER = 1. We normalize the
price indexes of traded goods at home and abroad so that PH = PF, as usually assumed in the literature,
i.e., in the steady state the terms of trade PFH are equal to unity. Moreover, from the price index equation





where pN = PN
P , pT = PT
P . From this relation we obtain PN = PT = P. The price index equations and
the fact that ER = 1 imply that in the steady state prices at home and abroad are equalized. Furthermore,








= ￿NVy(Y N) (14)
From the aggregate demand equations (7) and (4) we obtain:
Y H =
h
(1 ￿ ￿)￿C + (1 ￿ ￿￿)e ￿￿C
￿i
(15)14 Yuliya Rychalovska
Y N = ￿C (16)
The world aggregate resource constraint is given by: Y + Y
￿ = C + C
￿. Combining this condition




(1 ￿ ￿￿)e ￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(17)
This relation demonstrates that even under the complete market assumption, the structural asymmetries












3.1.2 Log-Linearization of the Optimality Conditions
We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions (4), (6)￿(10), and (12) and obtain the following set of log-
linear equations describing the dynamics of the multisectoral small open economy:
￿H;t = kH
￿





￿b YN;t + ￿b Ct ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b PNT;t + b ￿N;t ￿ ￿ b AN;t
￿
+ ￿Et￿N;t+1; (19)
b YH;t = ￿[￿ + (￿ ￿ !)￿]b PHT;t + !￿ b PNT;t + ￿ b Ct + w(1 ￿ ￿)d ERt + (1 ￿ ￿)b C￿
t + b gH;t; (20)




d ERt + b C￿
t ; (22)
d ERt = ￿ b PFH;t ￿ ￿ b PNT;t + ￿￿ b P￿
NT;t; (23)
￿b PNT;t = ￿N;t ￿ ￿H;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿b PFH;t (24)
Moreover, from the price index relation (1a) we note that:
b PHT;t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)b PFH;t (24a)
The Phillips curve relations in the two sectors are presented by equations (18) and (19), where kL =
(1￿￿L￿)(1￿￿L)
￿L(1+￿￿) is the constant that measures the response of the sectoral in￿ation rates to variations in
real marginal costs. The characterization of real marginal costs in the open economy setting differs from
that of the closed economy due to the gap between production and consumption as well as to the impact
of relative prices, which re￿ect the distinction between domestic and consumer prices. An improvement
in the terms of trade (a decrease in b PFH ) or a positive productivity shock result in a fall in marginal costs
in the traded sector. The marginal costs in the non-traded sector are independent of direct changes in the
terms of trade. However, the sectoral marginal costs are linked through the relative prices of non-traded
goods. This impact is opposite in sign and symmetric in magnitude. Producers’ pricing decisions are
forward-looking due to price stickiness. As a result, the Phillips curve takes the expectation-augmented
form. Equations (20) and (21) describe the aggregate demand for domestic goods in the two sectors.
We consider b C￿
t as a term that cannot be affected by dynamics in the home country. This variable is
exogenous from the small open economy perspective. Relation (22) is the log-linearized optimal risk-
sharing condition. It describes variations in domestic consumption depending on ￿uctuations in the
real exchange rate and consumption abroad. Equation (23), which is derived from (12), summarizes
the determinants of the real exchange rate. Again, the relative price of non-traded goods in the foreign
country is treated as exogenous. This equation illustrates the implication of the multisectoral economic
structure. Inparticular, changesinthetermsoftradedonotnecessarilyimplyacorrespondingadjustment
of the exchange rate, due to the impact of the relative prices of non-traded goods at home and abroad.Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 15
Finally, expression (24), which is in fact an identity, is obtained from the de￿nitions of non-traded and
traded goods in￿ation and describes the evolution of the price indexes for both sectors. The equation that
characterizes traded goods in￿ation is presented in the next subsection.
3.1.3 Domestic In￿ation, CPI In￿ation, and Some Aggregation Results
In this subsection we present several useful de￿nitions and identities which will be used in the subsequent
analysis. Log-linearization of price indexes (1) and (1a) yields :
b Pt = ￿ b PN;t + (1 ￿ ￿)b PT;t
b PT;t = ￿ b PH;t + (1 ￿ ￿)b PF;t





= b Pt ￿ b Pt￿1 we obtain the expressions for CPI
in￿ation and traded in￿ation:
￿t = ￿￿N;t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿T;t
￿T;t = ￿￿H;t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F;t
Moreover, the de￿nition of the terms of trade implies that ￿F;t = ￿b PFH;t + ￿H;t. The combination of
the equations presented above results in the following relationship between CPI and domestic in￿ation:
￿t = ￿D
t + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿b PFH;t (25)
where domestic in￿ation equals:
￿D
t = ￿￿N;t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿H;t: (25a)
Total output is given by:
PtYt = PN;tYN;t + PH;tYH;t (26)
Log-linearization of equation (26) yields:
b Yt = ￿b YN;t + (1 ￿ ￿)b YH;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)b PFH;t (27)
This relation implies that in an open multisectoral economy, aggregate output is not only the weighted
average of the sectoral outputs, but also a function of relative prices.
Moreover, the evolution of the nominal exchange rate is derived from the de￿nition of the real exchange
rate and takes the form:
d ERt ￿ d ERt￿1 = b St ￿ b St￿1 + ￿￿
t ￿ ￿t
where b St is the nominal exchange rate and ￿￿
t is CPI in￿ation for the foreign country. We assume that
the monetary authority abroad is implementing an in￿ation-targeting policy and thus ￿￿
t = 0. Such an
assumption is common in the small open economy literature (Gali and Monacelli, 2005).16 Yuliya Rychalovska
4. The Monetary Policy Problem and Welfare
This section will present the formulation of the monetary policy strategy and an analysis of the competing
objectives of the central bank. We will see that the model speci￿cation implies deviations of the optimal
monetary policy from complete price stabilization. Speci￿cally, we present a formal welfare analysis
and derive the objective function of the central bank based on a second-order approximation of both
the household’s utility and the structural equilibrium conditions (18)￿(24). Optimal monetary strategy
involvesmaximizationofthequadraticsocialwelfarefunction(minimizationofthelossfunction)subject
to linear constraints. Monetary policy is able to achieve the best outcome from the welfare perspective by
implementing the optimal plan. In this analysis we focus on optimal targeting rules, which are strongly
advocated by Svensson and Woodford.
4.1 The Objective Function of the Central Bank for an Open Economy with Multiple
Domestic Sectors
In order to obtain the analytical expression for welfare in a purely quadratic form, we apply the linear-
quadratic solution methods described in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005). This
approach is based on the idea presented in Sutherland (2002) to explore the dynamic characteristics of
the model and thus to account for the impact of the second moments of the variables on their levels.
The derivation of the objective function of the central bank is presented in the Mathematical Appendix.
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We eliminate the linear terms in the objective function by using a second-order approximation of the
equilibrium structural equations (18￿24). As a result, we obtain an objective function that is purely
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where b Y T
N;t, b Y T
H;t, d ER
T
t , and \ PNT;t
T
are welfare-relevant target variables, which are functions of sto-
chastic shocks and, in general, may not be identical to the ￿exible price allocations.
Equation (29) implies that the social welfare of the two-sector small open economy is affected by devia-
tions in the sectoral in￿ation rates, output gaps, and relative prices from their target values.
In fact, the objective function re￿ects the impact of various economic distortions on social welfare and
illustrates their relative contributions to the loss. First of all, price rigidities and monopolistic distor-Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 17
tions in both sectors, which may not be fully offset by production subsidies, result in economic in-
ef￿ciencies and introduce a role for in￿ation and output gap stabilization. The cross-output variable
(b YN;t ￿ b Y T
N;t)(b YH;t ￿ b Y T
H;t) describes the impact of co-movement in the sectoral output gaps on social
welfare. When the weight in the objective function associated with the interaction term is positive, the
sectoral asymmetries might be welfare improving. When this weight is negative, co-movement of the
sectoral outputs reduces welfare losses. In general, the weights next to each of the quadratic terms are
represented by complicated functions of the structural parameters of the model (details are presented in
the appendix).
Furthermore, when price rigidities are present in both sectors and domestic shocks are imperfectly corre-
lated, price changes are not synchronized following a shock. This results in inef￿cient output dispersion
between sectors and introduces a role for relative prices into the monetary policy design problem. In
this case, not only do the levels of in￿ation in both sectors matter for welfare, but so does the devi-
ation of the relative price from its target level. The open economy formulation brings an additional,
cross-country, dimension into the problem described above. Speci￿cally, nominal rigidities may prevent
prices in both countries from adjusting ef￿ciently after exchange rate movements. In other words, the
so-called relative price channel can fail to function accurately; this may result in welfare gains from
exchange rate stabilization. On the other hand, in an open economy the policymaker can manipulate the
terms of trade in order to increase expected consumption and decrease the expected disutility of pro-
duction, i.e., to improve welfare. Those incentives are called the terms of trade externality and were
analyzed by Benigno and Benigno (2006). Therefore, the weight next to the exchange rate term in the
loss function balances the stability objective determined by the economic distortions (nominal rigidities)
with the incentive of creating additional volatility in excess of the fundamental shocks. The cross fac-
tor (d ERt ￿ d ER
T
t )(b PNT;t ￿ b PT
NT;t) represents another "international dimension" term, which appears
due to the fact that the relative price of non-traded to traded goods partially drives the evolution of the
real exchange rate. This term, therefore, describes the additional welfare effects that originate from the
correlation between the two relative prices.
Equation (29) indicates that the loss function derived for our model speci￿cation is not identical to the
one of the closed economy or to the loss function obtained under the assumption ￿ = ￿ = ! = 1: The
general welfare representation, however, embodies these two special cases, which coincide in terms of
policy objectives and imply that WYNYH = 0 and WER = WPNT = WER;PNT = 0.
The presence of open economy terms is not the only implication of the exposure to external factors that
can be observed in the objective function. The relative weights on the sectoral in￿ation rates and output
gaps are not only affected by the structural asymmetries, like in the case of the closed economy, but
also display the incentives that arise under openness to trade of one of the domestic sectors. Speci￿-
cally, in an open economy, the weights in the objective function imply relatively higher stabilization of
the non-traded sector compared to the traded sector variables. Figures 1 and 2 present the weights on
in￿ation rates and output gaps as functions of the non-traded sector size derived for the closed and open
economies, respectively. The weights are computed under the baseline parameterization.18 Yuliya Rychalovska
Figure 1: Sector-Speci￿c Weights for the Closed Economy Model

































































Figure 2: Sector-Specific Weights for the Open Economy Model
Two important results can be highlighted when analyzing the ￿gures presented above. Firstly, graphs 1
and 2 indicate that both sectors are more volatile under the optimal policy when the economy is open
(the weights are lower for all values of ￿). Secondly, the decomposition of weights between sectors
changes depending on whether the economy is subject to external factors. In particular, ￿gure 1 indicates
that the weights derived for the closed economy model are symmetric and determined mainly by the
parameter ￿. The equal size of both sectors (￿ = 0:5) implies their equal contribution to the loss
function. On the contrary, ￿gure 2 demonstrates that in the open economy the stabilization "bias" is
shifted toward the non-traded sector. In other words, the sector that is open to trade is allowed to adjust
more at the optimum compared to the sector that produces goods only for internal consumption. Such
a result is driven by incentives to explore the terms of trade externality in a welfare-improving manner
combined with the monopolistic competition in the traded goods sector in countries H and F (measured
by the parameter ￿). Speci￿cally, domestic households can bene￿t from volatility in the traded sector
by varying the consumption and output of home goods. The possibility to substitute for foreign goods
in the consumption basket enables households to "divert" a part of production abroad and thus to lower
the costs of the home-goods in￿ation and reduce the economic inef￿ciencies. Therefore, the terms of
trade externality in￿uences the weights of both the relative price terms and the domestic variables in the
loss function. This effect is increasing in the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign traded
goods ￿.
4.1.1 The Relevance of the Welfare-Based Objective Function to the Current Practice of Central
Banks
The loss functions widely assumed in the literature on monetary policy are typically represented by
a quadratic expression that includes a weighted combination of in￿ation (CPI or domestic) and total
output gap terms. Analyzing the micro-founded welfare objective function (29) we can see that it differs
from the ad hoc forms in two important respects. First of all, it includes an open economy term and,
therefore, prescribesacertaindegreeofexchangeratemanagement. Secondly, itre￿ectsthemultisectoral
economic structure and differentiates between sector-speci￿c in￿ation rates and output gaps. Thus, the
lossfunctionderivedonthebasisoftheeconomicfundamentalsappearstobesigni￿cantlymorecomplex
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It is important to clarify why the objective function (29) does not explicitly display an important practical
feature of current monetary policy conduct. Speci￿cally, the majority of the central banks which have
adopted in￿ation targeting as an operational framework have speci￿ed their monetary policy objective in
terms of CPI in￿ation. Equation (29) indicates that the welfare loss of a small open economy depends
on the appropriate measure of domestic in￿ation rates and is not explicitly affected by import price
in￿ation. On the other hand, equation (25) illustrates the role of relative prices in movements of the
foreign in￿ation rate. Thus, the welfare-based objective function indirectly includes all components of
CPI in￿ation (except the lagged relative prices) but with the optimal weights.
At the same time it is possible to describe the conditions under which the explicit ￿F;t term can appear
in the loss function. In the most general case, the loss function captures the distortions present in the
domestic economy as well as the interrelations with the rest of the world. In particular, when countries
are big enough, economic developments in the neighboring economy can affect domestic welfare and
vice versa. The set of structural constraints for each country includes, in this case, both the domestic
and foreign equations. Since the quadratic welfare objective function is derived from the approxima-
tion of the welfare function and the structural equations, the interaction between economies can bring
foreign variables into the loss function of the domestic economy with country-speci￿c weights. Such
a framework is presented in Benigno and Benigno (2006), where they consider a two-country model
with countries of comparable size. This paper demonstrates that despite the non-zero weight on foreign
in￿ation in the loss function, the optimal targeting rules suggest a certain role for CPI in￿ation only in
the case of cooperation between countries. Such a result can be explained by the fact that under the
Nash regime (the non-cooperative case) the objective function is minimized only with respect to domes-
tic variables, and the strategy of the other policymaker and the sequence of the foreign in￿ation rate are
taken as given. In other words, the monetary authority does not care about the impact of domestic policy
on the other country. In the cooperative case, the effects of the actions in both countries are internalized
and the social planner optimizes with respect to all endogenous variables (domestic and foreign). As a
result, the optimal targeting rule contains the proper measure of world in￿ation, which brings a role for
CPI targeting.
Coming back to the model presented in this paper, the small open economy framework and, more specif-
ically, the limiting case (n ! 0) imply that the domestic economy cannot in￿uence the foreign country
because of its small size, and the rest of the world can be treated as a closed economy. In this sense,
countries are not directly interrelated in terms of consumption and production. The set of structural
constraints for country H contains only the domestic equations and the foreign variables are treated as
exogenous from the small open economy perspective. The implications of the foreign variables as well
as other structural shocks can be observed in the targets, the deviations from which the central bank
is trying to minimize. All other effects of the foreign dynamics are out of the control of the domestic
policymaker and can be interpreted as unavoidable losses or as terms that are independent of policy.20 Yuliya Rychalovska
4.2 The Optimal Monetary Policy Rules
In order to obtain the optimal targeting policy rules, we minimize the objective function (29) subject to
the set of constraints, which are given by:
￿H;t = kH
￿
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t ; (32)




(d ERt ￿ d ER
T
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(1 ￿ ￿)￿(d ERt ￿ d ER
T
t ) = ￿(￿N;t ￿ ￿H;t) ￿ (￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))￿(b PNT;t ￿ b PT
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t ; "t are functions of exogenous
shocks and arise when the target levels of variables and ￿exible price allocations diverge. The conditions
(30)￿(34) are obtained by combining the log-linearized equilibrium conditions (18)￿(24) and expressing
the relations in terms of gap variables. We assume that the central bank can commit to the policy that
maximizes welfare and consider the timeless perspective approach described in Woodford (2003). The
timeless perspective optimal policy assigns the particular value to the commitment to expectations prior
to period 0. The constraints on the initial conditions result in the time-invariant ￿rst-order conditions and
thus optimal policy. Therefore, the time inconsistency problem is eliminated. Following such a strategy,
the policymaker chooses the path for endogenous variables ￿H;t, ￿N;t, b YH;t, b YN;t, d ERt, b PNT;t subject to
constraints (30)￿(34) and given the initial conditions on ￿Ho, ￿No, b YHo, b YNo. The Lagrange multipliers
associated with the set of constraints are ￿1;t ￿￿5;t respectively. In addition, before the optimization we
divided equation (30) by kH, equation (31) by kN, and equation (34) by ￿. The ￿rst-order conditions to
the problem are given by:
W￿HkH￿H;t = ￿1;t ￿ ￿1;t￿1 + ￿5;tkH; (35)
W￿NkN￿N;t = ￿2;t ￿ ￿2;t￿1 ￿ ￿5;tkN; (36)
WYH(b YH;t ￿ b Y T
H;t) + WYNYH(b YN;t ￿ b Y T
N;t) = ￿3;t ￿ ￿￿1;t; (37)
WYN(b YN;t ￿ b Y T
N;t) + WYNYH(b YH;t ￿ b Y T
H;t) = ￿4;t ￿ ￿￿2;t; (38)
WER(d ERt ￿ d ER
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Combining equations (35)￿(40) we can eliminate the Lagrange multipliers and express the optimal policy
rule in the following general form:
A0￿ e Xt + A1￿ e Xt￿1 + A2￿ e Xt+1 = 0 (41)
where A0;A1;A2 are the matrices of parameters, ￿ e Xt = e Xt ￿ e Xt￿1; and e Xt = b Xt ￿ b XT
t , i.e., e Xt
denotes the vector of the endogenous variables (￿H;t, ￿N;t, b YH;t, b YN;t, d ERt, b PNT;t) in deviations from
their target values.Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 21
Therefore, the optimal policy rule is represented by a fairly complicated expression that prescribes the
response to deviations in the sectoral in￿ation rates and output gaps as well as to ￿uctuations in relative
prices. The reaction function (41) includes both backward and forward-looking endogenous variables.
The matrices of the parameters A, which describe the optimal magnitude of the response, depend on the
optimal weights and the structural parameters of the model.
For comparison, the optimal policy rule derived with the use of the similar methodology for the one-
sector open economy model takes the general form: A0￿ e Xt = 0. Therefore, the multi-sectoral model
speci￿cation brings in more complex dynamics of variables under the optimal policy. Speci￿cally, rule
(41) is more persistent, i.e., it prescribes the response to the ￿rst and the second lag of the endogenous
variables. Moreover, the rule contains forward-looking components, since A2 6= 0. The characteristics of
the policy rule mentioned above are determined by the persistent structure of one of the model equations
(34), which describes the evolution of the sector-speci￿c in￿ation rates and the two types of relative
prices.
4.2.1 Policy Trade-Offs
The welfare function (29) indicates that the monetary authority is confronted with several policy objec-
tives. In particular, the central bank has to control the sector-speci￿c in￿ation rates and output gaps, as
well as relative prices. In order to study the optimal plan, it is important to investigate whether the policy
goals can be simultaneously attained or the central bank has to decide how to balance them appropri-
ately. Where the objectives do not con￿ict with each other, the central bank can achieve the ￿rst best
allocation and completely eliminate the loss. In this section we describe the policy trade-offs that arise
in a generalized model of a two-sector small open economy.
We analyze equation (24) expressed in terms of the welfare-relevant gap variables:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(d ERt ￿ d ER
T
t ) = ￿(￿N;t ￿ ￿H;t) ￿ (￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))￿(b PNT;t ￿ b PT
NT;t) + "t (42)
The gaps depend on the target levels of the variables, which in turn are functions of the shocks and
parameters and vary over time. Equation (42) indicates that it is not possible to stabilize in￿ation rates
in each sector and to eliminate the gaps between relative prices and their target values at the same time.
In fact, relative prices act as endogenous shocks that do not allow the same policy to attain zero in￿ation
in both sectors. For example, under a productivity shock in the non-traded goods sector (￿gure 4),
the optimal policy implies depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Complete stability of non-traded
in￿ation would require an even larger increase in the exchange rate. This, however, would result in a
further worsening of the terms of trade and a greater rise in home-goods in￿ation. A similar trade-off
exists under ￿scal and mark-up shocks. Moreover, the impulse-responses indicate that the magnitude of
the response differs across sector-speci￿c variables. The different sensitivity of the domestic sectors to
shocks is determined not only by structural asymmetries such as sector size, elasticity of substitution, and
the level of nominal rigidities, but also by the openness to trade of one of the domestic sectors. Therefore,
the optimal policy cannot comply with all the sector-speci￿c stabilization objectives simultaneously.
Woodford (2003) illustrates that a corresponding trade-off also exists in the closed economy model (￿=1)
if the target rate of the relative price (the natural rate) is not constant.
Furthermore, we address the question of whether complete stability of the aggregate variables is attain-
able under the given economic structure. We present the Phillips curve relations in terms of gap variables
and use the de￿nition of domestic in￿ation. Moreover, in this analysis we assume for simplicity that the
target variables and ￿exible price allocations coincide and the degree of nominal rigidities is equal across
sectors. We combine the constraints (30)￿(33) and apply the de￿nition of domestic in￿ation (25a). As a22 Yuliya Rychalovska
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where l = (￿￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿) , e l = l ￿ (￿! ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)￿ , and the ￿exible price allocations of
the variables are functions of the exogenous shocks b AH;t; b AN;t; b P￿
NT;t; C￿
t : Moreover, we make use of
equation (27) and provide the alternative domestic Phillips curve relation in order to analyze the impact
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We present two special cases of our more general analysis in order to describe the role of relative prices
in generating the policy trade-offs. Firstly, we consider a two-sector closed-economy setting, i.e., ￿ =
1;￿ > 0. In such a situation l = e l = 0. Equations (43) and (44) illustrate that the sectoral Phillips
curves reduce to the classical aggregate relation, which, at the same time, describes the dynamics for the
one-sector closed economy. Therefore, there is no con￿ict between in￿ation and output gap stabilization,
and optimal monetary policy is able to implement the ￿rst best, i.e., ￿exible price allocation. This result
has been shown by Woodford (2003).
Secondly, we assume the special case of unitary elasticity of substitution and a unitary coef￿cient of
relative risk aversion, i.e., the balanced trade model speci￿cation as in Liu and Pappa (2005). Again we
have l = e l = 0. Thus the exchange rate and relative prices vanish from the Phillips curve relations (43)
and (44). Moreover, the assumption ￿ = ￿ = ! = 1 implies that the exchange rate does not characterize
a welfare-relevant policy objective. In this situation, the terms of trade act as an endogenous "cost-push
shock," which generates tension between domestic in￿ation and the output gap. In fact, such a trade-
off can be generated in closed economy models in the presence of mark-up shocks or adjustment costs
(Benigno and Woodford, 2005; Erceg and Levin, 2006).
Finally, we consider our two-sector model under general preferences. The Phillips curve (43) illustrates
thatthestabilizationofdomesticin￿ationandoutputsinbothsectorsdoesnotinvolveequivalentpolicies,
due to the presence of relative prices. Moreover, equation (44) indicates that there is tension between
domestic in￿ation and exchange rate stability in addition to the trade-off between domestic in￿ation and
aggregate output gap variability. Therefore, unless preferences are speci￿ed in the general form, the
con￿ict between managing domestic in￿ation and the real exchange rate ceases to exist.
The fairly complex economic structure and general model speci￿cation determine the non-trivial task
facing policymakers, i.e., the search for the second-best optimal policy given that the ￿exible price ef￿-
cient allocation of resources cannot be replicated. The optimal reaction function (41), in fact, represents
such a second-best solution. A similar result is obtained in the one-sector open-economy model analyzed
by De Paoli (2006). In our case, however, the de￿nition of the real exchange rate implies a distinction
between the two types of relative prices and enables us to characterize the dynamics and impact of each
variable separately. Moreover, the multiple sectors imply an additional policy challenge, i.e., the proper
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5. Impulse-Response Functions
In this section we examine the impulse-responses of key macroeconomic variables to exogenous shocks.
Speci￿cally, we compare the numerical results under the optimal plan with the outcomes achieved un-
der the basic simple rules common in the literature, such as domestic in￿ation targeting (DIT), consumer
price index in￿ation targeting (CPIT), and an exchange rate peg (PEG). We consider four types of shocks,
i.e., productivity, foreign, ￿scal, and mark-up shocks. For the numerical exercise we assume the coef￿-
cient of relative risk aversion ￿ = 3 and the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods ￿ = 10
as in Benigno and Benigno (2006). Following Rotenberg and Woodford (1997) we set ￿ = 0:99 and
￿ = 0:47. The elasticity of substitution between traded home and foreign goods ￿ is assumed to be equal
to 1:5 and the parameter that measures the substitution between non-traded and traded goods ! is set to
0:5. The level of price rigidities ￿ = 0:66, implying that the average length of price contracts is equal to
3 quarters. These assumptions are common in the open economy literature. In our benchmark speci￿ca-
tion we consider an equal level of price rigidities across sectors. Moreover, the share of non-traded goods
in the consumption basket ￿ is set to 0.5. The corresponding parameter for the foreign country ￿￿ = 0:6:
The degree of openness ￿ = 0:6, implying a 40% import share. Finally, the steady state mark-up in
the traded sector ￿H is set to the value 1=￿ as in Liu and Pappa (2005) and De Paoli (2006) in order to
guarantee the optimal subsidy policy. In addition, the equal size of both domestic sectors implies that
￿H = ￿N: In this paper we assume that shocks are uncorrelated and have equal variance ￿2 = 0:0001.
Figure 3 represents the impulse-responses to a positive productivity shock in the traded sector, b AH.
All regimes (except PEG) imply a reaction of the monetary authority that induces a depreciation of the
nominal exchange rate. Such dynamics, together with a fall in the price of home goods, worsen the
terms of trade and thus result in a real depreciation. The increase in the exchange rate is the largest
under DIT, because in this case the central bank stabilizes in￿ation more aggressively. In fact, higher
home-goods in￿ation stability is traded for some additional exchange rate volatility. CPI in￿ation rises
under DIT and the optimal plan. Here two effects are at work: the impact of the nominal exchange rate
and the adjustment of the sectoral in￿ation rates after the productivity shock. Speci￿cally, the increase
in the exchange rate and prices in the non-traded sector dominate the fall in home-goods in￿ation, and
the overall impact on CPI in￿ation is positive. Under PEG, the nominal exchange rate is stable and the
effect of the productivity shock on CPI in￿ation is determined by the fall in in￿ation in the home-goods
sector.
Domestic output increases due to the real exchange rate depreciation. Domestic goods become relatively
cheaper than foreign goods. However, the increase in output is not large enough to boost production
above its target level and the total impact on the output gap is negative. The expenditure switching effect
is the most pronounced under the DIT regime, which implies no control over the exchange rate and thus
allows for greater real depreciation. As a result, the output response is the largest. On the contrary, under
PEG and CPIT the expenditure switching effect is minimized and the output gap falls by more compared
to the other regimes.
The negative response of home-goods in￿ation under all the regimes is determined by the direct impact
of the productivity shock, which lowers the marginal costs in this sector. However, the marginal costs
in the non-tradable sector increase. Speci￿cally, non-traded output increases and the relative price of
non-traded to traded goods b PNT falls under DIT and the optimal plan, due to nominal depreciation. As
a result, non-traded in￿ation rises.
Figure 4 presents the impulse-response to a productivity shock in the non-traded sector, b AN. The dy-
namics of the variables can be described in a similar fashion. The shock lowers the marginal costs in the
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authority causes depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Both the fall in the price of non-traded goods
and the nominal depreciation, which worsens the terms of trade, result in real depreciation. In￿ation in
the home-goods sector rises due to the increase in the terms of trade. It is important to note that non-
traded in￿ation is stabilized to a greater extent under the optimal plan compared to the alternative simple
rules. The reason for such a policy reaction is that the optimal welfare function assigns the greatest
weight to stabilization of non-traded in￿ation. At the same time, the productivity shock b AN directly
affects the price change in this sector and, hence, induces greater dynamics of this variable. In order to
prevent large swings in non-traded in￿ation, the central bank allows greater adjustments in relative prices
and output. In addition, the response of relative prices (b PNT and d ER) is almost two times stronger than
the responses of these variables following the productivity shock b AH. Again, the reason is that instability
of non-traded in￿ation has larger negative welfare consequences than changes in home-goods in￿ation.
The output reaction is positive in both sectors due to the large expenditure switching effect under DIT
and the optimal plan. Unlike the negative response of the output gap following the productivity shock
in the home-goods sector, the b AN shock results in an increase of output above its target level due to the
more expansionary policy.
Figure 5 presents the responses of domestic variables to the innovation in foreign consumption, b C￿. We
can observe that the DIT regime is similar to the optimal plan in terms of the direction and magnitude
of the response. The foreign consumption shock raises domestic consumption through the risk-sharing
condition. This, in turn, may induce an increase in domestic output. At the same time, the nominal
and real exchange rates appreciate and the terms of trade fall. Domestic goods become relatively less
competitive and demand shifts to foreign goods. The net effect on home output is negative under DIT
and the optimal plan. The exchange rate appreciation and the output fall are larger under the DIT regime.
In this case, the effect of the shock on aggregate domestic production exactly matches the impact of the
disturbance on the target level of output and the response of the gap variable is zero. CPI in￿ation falls
due to the exchange rate appreciation. At the same time the sectoral in￿ation rates show just a slight
response to the shock. The impact of the shock on the macro-variables is qualitatively different under
the CPIT and PEG regimes. Speci￿cally, the monetary authority stabilizes relative prices and the real
appreciation is small. The expenditure switching effect is dominated by the positive impact of the shock
on domestic consumption and demand. As a result, the outputs in both sectors as well as the output gap
show a signi￿cant increase. Such a boost in production increases marginal costs, and in￿ation in both
sectors rises.
Figure 6 presents the impulse-responses to a shock to foreign relative prices, b P￿
NT. An increase in
the relative price of non-traded to traded goods abroad could be caused by a decrease in the price of
foreign goods P￿
T following the productivity shock in sector F￿. Again, the DIT regime almost perfectly
replicates the optimal response. The reaction of the central bank results in a small nominal depreciation.
The change in relative prices, however, is signi￿cant. The terms of trade fall sharply due to a decrease in
the domestic currency price of foreign goods. The relative price of non-traded to traded goods increases.
Domestic households substitute for cheaper goods in the consumption basket and demand in the home-
goods production sector falls. Non-traded output remains almost unaffected due to the low elasticity of
substitution between goods N and H. CPI in￿ation falls following the decrease of the terms of trade,
whereas the responses of the sectoral in￿ation rates are quantitatively small.
The policy reaction following the b P￿
NT shock displays a sharp contrast between the responses under
the CPIT and PEG regimes, whereas under the other types of shocks these two regimes induce very
similar changes in economic activity. Speci￿cally, under the CPIT regime the central bank prevents large
movements in the terms of trade at the expense of additional domestic in￿ation volatility. The policy
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of trade. The nominal depreciation under the stabilized CPI in￿ation results in real depreciation. This,
in turn, increases domestic production and in￿ation in both sectors. On the contrary, the PEG regime
induces a policy that is closer to the optimal plan and DIT. Where foreign and home goods are substitutes,
the optimal response implies a greater nominal exchange rate stabilization in order to improve the terms
of trade and divert production abroad by switching to consumption of foreign goods. Such a policy is
welfare improving because it enables one to take advantage of the foreign productivity shock by reducing
domestic marginal costs and the inef￿cient output dispersion associated with price rigidities.
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses to a mark-up shock in the home-goods sector, b ￿H. The optimal
policy diverges from complete domestic in￿ation stabilization and the other alternative simple rules.
The positive shock leads to a rise in home-goods in￿ation, which returns to its initial level after several
periods of de￿ation, and a temporary fall in the output gap. The extent to which the shock affects output
versus in￿ation depends on the weight that the central bank places on output gap variability in the loss
function. Speci￿cally, the optimal policy, unlike the alternative simple rules, implies a certain degree of
output gap stability. Therefore, in￿ation is allowed to increase more and the output gap to fall less under
the optimal plan. The response of the monetary authority to a mark-up shock implies depreciation of the
exchange rate, an increase in the terms of trade, and a fall in the relative price of non-traded to traded
goods. Domestic consumption rises in response to a shock. As a result, the outputs in both domestic
sectors increase. The output gap, however, falls due to the fall in home-goods output below its target
value.
The responses to a mark-up shock in the non-traded sector, b ￿N, are presented in ￿gure 8. Again, the
central bank has to balance con￿icting policy objectives ￿ to absorb the upward pressure on in￿ation in
the non-traded sector by a fall in the output gap. The exchange rate appreciates and consumption and
output decrease under the optimal plan. The DIT regime implies a greater economic contraction and thus
the largest fall in output and consumption. CPIT and PEG represent strongly suboptimal regimes because
they induce excessive stabilization of relative prices and a higher response of non-traded in￿ation.
The comparative analysis of impulse-responses under the b ￿H and b ￿N shocks suggests that the optimal
policy reacts more aggressively under the disturbance to a non-traded mark-up. Such a response re￿ects
the decomposition of weights in the welfare objective function, which assigns higher weights to the
non-traded sector variables. The optimal policy implies a greater economic contraction under the b ￿N
shock. The output gaps in both sectors and consumption fall in order to reduce the upward pressure on
non-traded in￿ation, the variable which may induce the largest welfare losses. As a result, the allowed
non-traded in￿ation volatility following the b ￿N shock is more than two times smaller than the response of
home-goods in￿ation after the b ￿H shock. In addition, the decrease in the output gap in the home-goods
sector absorbs the major part of the positive upward pressure on in￿ation. In other words, the aggregate
output gap changes to a greater extent due to the adjustment of the traded sector output gap, which is
allowed to be more volatile under the optimal plan.
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the responses to ￿scal shocks in the traded and non-traded sectors, respec-
tively. Again, theoptimalpolicydifferssigni￿cantlyfromthesimplepolicyrules. Theriseingovernment
spending b gH increases home-goods output. The central bank, which aims at domestic in￿ation stabiliza-
tion, offsets the upward pressure on home-goods in￿ation by a corresponding decrease in non-traded
in￿ation. The response induces an initial appreciation of the exchange rate, a fall in the terms of trade,
and a rise in the relative price of non-traded to traded goods. As a result, consumption and non-traded
output decrease. The optimal plan, on the contrary, implies a somewhat expansionary policy. The ex-
changerate depreciates, implyingan additionalstimulustooutput inbothdomestic sectors. Suchapolicy
prevents the initial drop in consumption. The CPI and PEG regimes imply greater stability of relative
prices. A slight fall in the terms of trade turns out to be suf￿cient for consumer price stabilization.26 Yuliya Rychalovska
The government spending shock b gN increases non-traded output and creates upward pressure on non-
traded in￿ation. Therefore, unlike in the previous case, the optimal policy implies an economic con-
traction. The response of the central bank is the most aggressive compared to the alternative policy
rules. The nominal exchange rate sharply appreciates and output in the traded sector and consumption
decrease. The relative price of non-traded to traded goods increases because non-traded goods become
relatively scarce and import prices fall. As a result, greater non-traded in￿ation stability is achieved at the
expense of additional volatility of in￿ation and output in the traded sector, as well as a larger adjustment
of relative prices.
The analysis of the numerical results suggests that the type of shock and the economic structure are im-
portant determinants of the comparative performance of optimal versus simple policy rules. Speci￿cally,
the responses under the optimal policy differ the most from the simple rules under ￿scal and mark-up
shocks. On the contrary, the DIT regime better approximates the optimal plan under foreign and pro-
ductivity shocks. In addition, the optimal and PEG regimes come closer under a foreign relative price
shock. Shocks of the same type but affecting different domestic sectors may induce qualitatively distinct
economic responses due to the sector-speci￿c weights in the optimal welfare function. In particular, the
optimal policy is expansionary with respect to ￿scal and mark-up shocks in the traded sector, whereas
identical shocks in the non-traded sector call for an economic contraction.
The DIT regime induces a more expansionary policy under a traded-sector productivity shock, whereas
the policy is less active following foreign shocks. Fiscal and mark-up disturbances result in an economic
contraction under DIT. Under the CPI and PEG regimes, the policy is less aggressive in response to
domestic productivity shocks and it becomes more expansionary under foreign shocks.
6. Welfare Implications of the Alternative Simple Rules
The study of the optimal policy problem presented in the previous sections provides a useful theoretical
foundation for the design of monetary strategy and offers a rigorous benchmark for comparing the perfor-
mance of alternative monetary regimes. At the same time, the prescriptions of the optimal policy given
by expression (41) might be too dif￿cult for the general public to interpret and too dif￿cult to put into
practice. Therefore, the analysis of the alternative policy rules, which deliver reasonable welfare results
and at the same time are simple and transparent, and the optimal rule, which has normative implications,
should interact in a complementary way in order to provide bene￿cial economic conclusions. In this
section we enhance the analysis of the optimal policy with a discussion of the alternative simple rules
and present their comparative performance. Speci￿cally, we use Dynare software in order to compute
so-called optimal simple rules (OSRs). As a result, we are able to analyze rules with a simple structure
but with optimized coef￿cients.
We address two important issues. Firstly, we consider several types of alternative simple rules classi￿ed
depending on the variables entering the rules and investigate the extent to which alternative monetary
regimes are able to replicate the optimal solution. Secondly, we explore the implications of the alternative
simple rules for macroeconomic volatility.
The welfare ranking is performed on the basis of the value of the loss, which is computed by taking the
unconditional expectations of expression (29), i.e., the second-order approximation to the utility of the
representative consumer, expressed as a fraction of the steady state consumption. As a result, we present
the value of the loss in terms of the variances/covariances of the sector-speci￿c in￿ation rates, outputWelfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 27
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Table 1 reports the welfare losses associated with various types of OSRs. Speci￿cally, we consider
simple rules which include domestic variables only and rules that prescribe the response to both closed
andopenedeconomyterms. Inaddition, wewouldliketoevaluatethebene￿tsoftargetingsector-speci￿c
in￿ation rates and outputs versus aggregate variables. This issue is practically important since central
banks do not usually differentiate their policy response depending on the economic sector and consider
aggregate variables, due to the problem of policy implementation and a lack of information. Moreover,
we consider rules that include lagged domestic in￿ation, because the optimal reaction function (41)
contains persistent components.
Table 1. Welfare Ranking of Optimal Simple Rules
Policy Rule Optimized coef￿cients Loss to optimal
k1 k2 k3 k4 V OSR
V OPT
1. DIT: k1￿D = 0 1 - - - 1.333
DIT-output targeting:
2. k1￿D + k2e Y = 0 1.91 0.04 - - 1.215
3. k1￿D + k2e YH + k3e YN = 0 2.05 0.05 0.15 - 1.090
4. k1￿D + k2e YH + k3e YN + k4￿D
￿1 = 0 1.99 0.05 0.13 1.09 1.069
DIT-output-ER targeting:
5. k1￿D + k2e Y + k3g ER = 0 2.07 0.06 0.03 - 1.092
Sector-speci￿c in￿ation targeting:
6. k1￿H + k2￿N = 0 0.66 1.34 - - 1.305
7. k1￿H + k2￿N + k3e Y + k4g ER = 0 0.60 2.86 0.09 0.05 1.059
8. CPIT: k1￿CPI = 0 1 - - - 2.532
9. PEG - - - - 2.989
Table 1 indicates that the welfare losses under the OSRs are on average (except for the CPI and PEG
regimes) 10-30% larger compared to the optimal rule. The DIT regime performs worse compared to
the results obtained in the previous literature. In particular, in the special case of the open economy
model presented in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and the framework with ad-hoc welfare objectives as
in Soto (2004), the DIT regime represents or nearly replicates the ￿rst-best. In our case, however, the
ranking of alternative regimes suggests that strict in￿ation targeting is suboptimal compared to policies
that account for other policy objectives. Speci￿cally, the DIT strategy is dominated by the rules that
prescribe the response to deviations in the output gap. Moreover, the rules that account for sector-
speci￿c variations in outputs perform better compared to the case of targeting the aggregate variable. In
particular, implementing rule 3 instead of rule 2 brings a 10.3% reduction in the welfare losses. At the
same time, augmenting the rule that responds to domestic in￿ation and total output with an exchange rate
term allows one to achieve a welfare result that is equivalent to the case of targeting the traded and non-
traded output gaps separately. Furthermore, the inclusion of lagged domestic in￿ation in the policy rule
further improves welfare, though to a lesser extent. Complete stabilization of the appropriately weighted
average of the sectoral in￿ation rates (rule 6) produces better results than DIT. However, rule 6, which
anyway responds merely to price changes, is dominated by the strategies that incorporate the output and
exchange rate policy objectives. The CPI and PEG regimes represent the least attractive alternatives to
the optimal rule from the welfare viewpoint. The poor performance of CPI targeting can be explained28 Yuliya Rychalovska
by the excess smoothness of relative prices which this regime entails. Over-stabilization of the terms of
trade prevents prices from adjusting ef￿ciently in response to shocks and augments the negative impact
of nominal rigidities on welfare. This generates a signi￿cant deviation from the optimal policy. In
other words, CPI targeting represents too general a policy regime. It aggregates several welfare-relevant
variables (domestic in￿ation rates and relative prices), prescribing a suboptimal reaction to deviations in
these terms.
The values of the optimized coef￿cients k1, k2, k3, and k4 displayed in table 1 provide information about
the relative magnitude of the policy response to deviations in key macroeconomic variables. Speci￿cally,
the OSRs indicate that the policy should respond more aggressively to variations in the non-traded sec-
tor variables. The response to ￿uctuations in the exchange rate is approximately 1
2 of the response to
deviations in the output gap.
The important criterion for evaluating the performance of the simple rules is the level of macroeconomic
stability which they induce. Alternative regimes may generate comparable welfare results but, at the
same time, imply different volatility of the macroeconomic variables. This issue becomes particularly
important prior to entering the Eurozone, when the monetary authority has to ful￿ll speci￿c and some-
times con￿icting stabilization objectives. Table 2 presents the standard deviations of the key variables
under different OSRs relative to the standard deviations implied by the optimal policy.
Table 2. Macroeconomic Volatility under Alternative Policy Rules
(standard deviation in % under various OSRs relative to the optimal rule, st:devOSR
st:devOPT )
Policy Rule Variables
￿D ￿CPI ￿H ￿N e Y f YH f YN g ER g PNT
1. DIT: k1￿D = 0 0 1.178 0.54 0.882 1.22 1.388 0.743 1.166 1.116
DIT-output targeting:
2. k1￿D + k2e Y = 0 0.745 1.169 0.79 0.943 0.967 1.176 0.821 1.198 1.113
3. k1￿D + k2e YH + k3e YN = 0 1.054 1.09 0.98 1.105 0.915 1.036 0.883 1.112 1.053
4. k1￿D + k2e YH + k3e YN + k4￿D
￿1 = 0 0.943 1.081 0.913 1.054 0.895 1.006 0.93 1.109 1.048
DIT-output-ER targeting:
5. k1￿D + k2e Y + k3g ER = 0 1.054 0.959 0.866 1.291 1.003 1.021 1.038 1.015 0.961
Sector-speci￿c in￿ation targeting:
6. k1￿H + k2￿N = 0 0.333 1.236 0.736 0.577 1.198 1.39 0.659 1.191 1.159
7. k1￿H + k2￿N + k3e Y + k4g ER = 0 1.105 1.018 1.021 1.105 1.007 1.034 0.987 1.022 1.0001
8. CPIT: k1￿CPI = 0 2.667 0 1.658 2.848 1.567 1.186 2.308 0.686 0.382
9. PEG 3.197 0.287 2 3.317 1.669 1.277 2.448 0.61 0.454
Comparing the volatility under the alternative regimes we note that the rules that strictly target aggregate
variables naturally perform the worst in terms of stabilization of the particular economic sectors. Thus,
under the DIT, CPI, and PEG regimes, the volatility of the sector-speci￿c variables diverges the most
from the deviations implied by the optimal rule. In particular, both sectoral in￿ation rates are 45￿12%
over-stabilized under the DIT regime. At the same time, the output gap in the home-goods sector is
almost 40% more volatile relative to its standard deviation under the optimal policy.Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 29
The comparison of DIT and the rule that targets the properly weighted domestic in￿ation index (rule 6)
suggests that under the latter, non-traded in￿ation is less volatile. Such an outcome re￿ects the different
magnitude of the policy response with respect to the sectoral in￿ation rates expressed by the optimal
values of the parameters k1 and k2. However, in both cases, strict ful￿llment of the in￿ation objectives
comes at the expense of higher volatility of the output gap and relative prices and generates negative
welfare effects. Therefore, the rule that accounts for both the output gap and in￿ation goals (rule 2)
outperforms the strict in￿ation-targeting regimes. Moreover, the rule that stabilizes the traded and non-
traded output gaps separately (rule 3) allows the standard deviations of the sector-speci￿c variables to
be brought closer to the optimal values and, at the same time, reduces the volatility of relative prices.
Rule 4, which includes lagged domestic in￿ation, provides further welfare improvements and induces
nearly optimal volatility of non-traded in￿ation, the variable which has the highest weight in the loss
function. Finally, regime (5), which displays the features of an open economy, i.e., prescribes a certain
degree of exchange rate management, performs well in terms of relative price stabilization but implies
higher variation in non-traded in￿ation. In particular, an 8.5% decrease in the standard deviation of the
exchange rate results in a 22.5% increase in the volatility of non-traded goods in￿ation and an 11.8%
increase in the standard deviation of domestic in￿ation. Adopting rule 7, which targets sector-speci￿c
in￿ation rates in addition to total output and the exchange rate, allows more ef￿cient reallocation of the
response to deviations in sectoral price changes and thus yields a superior welfare outcome.
The results of this section demonstrate the tension between the objectives of domestic in￿ation and real
exchange rate stabilization as well as the in￿ation-output gap policy trade-off common in the literature.
We also numerically assess the welfare bene￿ts of differentiating the policy response depending on eco-
nomic sectors compared to stabilizing aggregate variables. Moreover, we show that the welfare results
achieved under the ￿sector-speci￿c￿ targeting rules can be closely replicated by a rule with an appropri-
ate combination of aggregate variables, namely, the total output gap and the exchange rate. Therefore,
responding to the open economy terms may contribute to welfare improvements when the central bank
does not have enough information about sector-speci￿c variables.
The exercise presented in this section has important practical implications. In particular, it could pro-
vide policymakers with a tool for analyzing the relative importance of monetary policy objectives and
facilitate the design of a strategy aimed at achieving several competing goals.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the stabilization objectives of optimal monetary policy in a two-sector small
open economy model obtained as a limiting case of a two-country DSGE framework. We assessed the
roleofgeneralpreferences, structuralasymmetries, andmultiplerelativepricesinmonetarypolicydesign
and welfare evaluation. The stabilization objectives derived for our model speci￿cation and represented
by the loss function display the features of an open economy and re￿ect a multisectoral economic struc-
ture. Speci￿cally, it is shown that social welfare is affected by deviations in in￿ation rates and output
gaps (with sector-speci￿c weights) as well as in relative prices from their target values. Therefore, the
micro-founded welfare objective function differs from the ad hoc forms widely assumed in the applied
literature. The exposure of one of the domestic sectors to the external environment not only determines
the presence of open economy terms in the loss function, but also affects the decomposition of weights
between domestic variables. In particular, the sector that is open to trade is allowed to adjust more at the
optimum compared to the sector that produces goods for internal consumption only. Such a result implies
a qualitatively different magnitude of the response to deviations in sector-speci￿c variables compared to
the closed economy setting and determines the asymmetric response of the domestic sectors to various30 Yuliya Rychalovska
shocks. We characterized the optimal policy by the optimal targeting rule, which is a rather complex
expression.
Finally, we experimented with alternative simple rules and analyzed their ability to replicate the optimal
solution. The numerical results suggest that the type of shock is an important determinant of the com-
parative performance of optimal versus simple policy rules. Speci￿cally, the optimal responses differ
the most from the simple rules under ￿scal and mark-up shocks. On the contrary, the DIT regime better
approximates the optimal plan under foreign and productivity shocks.
An analysis of the welfare implications of alternative simple rules suggests that strict targeting of domes-
tic and CPI in￿ation does not yield the best approximations for the optimal policy, and social welfare can
be improved by accounting for other policy objectives, namely, the output gap and the exchange rate.
We presented a ranking of alternative simple rules and evaluated the welfare bene￿ts of targeting sector-
speci￿c versus aggregate variables. In addition, we showed that the rules which stabilize sector-speci￿c
output gaps can be closely replicated by a rule that responds to the aggregate output gap and the exchange
rate. Such a result is important because a strategy which differentiates the response between domestic
sectors is dif￿cult to design and implement in practice. Generally, the simple rules perform quite well
in terms of macroeconomic stabilization (relative to the optimal rule) and can deliver reasonable welfare
results. An analysis of macroeconomic volatility under the simple rules demonstrated that our model
generated an endogenous con￿ict between the objectives of domestic in￿ation and real exchange rate
stabilization in addition to the in￿ation-output gap policy trade-off common in the literature.
In general, the analysis of optimal monetary policy based on micro-foundations which we employed in
this paper enabled us to uncover important effects and incentives that arise in an open multisectoral econ-
omy. We were able to provide a welfare analysis based on economic fundamentals. Moreover, alternative
simple rules were ranked according to a rigorous (but tractable) welfare measure. At the same time we
would like to underline the drawbacks of such a methodological approach. In particular, the model lacks
in￿ation inertia and persistence. This is a common disadvantage of the New Keynesian class of models,
which do not re￿ect the actual dynamics of in￿ation and output. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to
rather normative conclusions and admit the limited use of such models for forecasting purposes. How-
ever, we are convinced that the micro-founded and so-called reduced form approaches should interact in
a complementary way in order to provide the appropriate policy recommendations. In fact, a compara-
tive assessment of the monetary policy prescriptions derived in more applied studies versus the optimal
reactions based on micro-foundations would be an interesting point for further analysis.Welfare-Based Optimal Monetary Policy in a Two-Sector Small Open Economy 31
References
AOKI, K. (2001): ￿Optimal monetary policy responses to relative price changes.￿ Journal of Monetary
Economics, 48:55￿80.
BENIGNO, G. AND BENIGNO, P. (2006): ￿Designing targeting rules for international monetary policy
coordination.￿ Journal of Monetary Economics, 53:473￿506.
BENIGNO, G. AND BENIGNO, P. (2003): ￿Price stability in open economies.￿ The Review of Economic
Studies.
BENIGNO, P. AND WOODFORD, M. (2005): ￿In￿ation stabilization and welfare: The case of large
distortions.￿ Journal of the European Economic Association, 1:1￿52.
CLARIDA, R., GALI, J., AND GERTLER, M. (2001): ￿Optimal monetary policy in open versus closed
economies. An integrated approach.￿ American Economic Review, 91(2).
CORSETTI, G. AND PESENTI, P. (2005): ￿International dimensions of optimal monetary policy.￿
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(2):281￿305.
DE PAOLI, B. (2006): ￿Optimal monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy.￿ CEP Discus-
sion Papers 639, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
ERCEG, C. AND LEVIN, A. (2006): ￿Optimal monetary policy with durable consumption goods.￿
Journal of Monetary Economics, 53:1341￿1359.
GALI, J. AND MONACELLI, T. (2005): ￿Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open
economy.￿ Review of Economic Studies, 72(3).
HL￿DIK, T. (2003): ￿Modelling the second-round effects of supply-side shocks on in￿ation.￿ CNB
Working Paper Series 12, Czech National Bank.
LIU, Z. AND PAPPA, E. (2005): ￿Gains from international monetary policy coordination. Does it pay
to be different?￿ Working Paper, European Central Bank.
MONACELLI, T. (2003): ￿Monetary policy in a low pass-through environment.￿ Working Paper 227,
European Central Bank.
SOTO, C. (2003): ￿Non-traded goods and monetary policy trade-offs in a small open economy.￿ Work-
ing Paper 214, Central Bank of Chile.
SUTHERLAND, A. (2002): ￿Incomplete pass-through and the welfare effects of exchange rate variabil-
ity.￿ Discussion Paper 0212, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
WOODFORD, M. (2003): Interest and prices: Foundation of a theory of monetary policy. Princeton
University Press.32 Yuliya Rychalovska
8. Mathematical Appendix
8.1 Second-Order Approximation to the Utility Function and Equilibrium Conditions
We apply the methodology described in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005) in order to
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where t:i:p: denotes terms that are independent of policy and (
￿ ￿￿3￿ ￿) denotes terms that are of third order
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￿L(1+￿￿) , for L = H;N.
We now derive the second-order approximation to the structural equilibrium conditions. Following Be-
nigno and Woodford (2005), we approximate the optimal price-setting equation (expression (10) in the
main text) for both domestic sectors as well as the law of motion for the sectoral price indexes (11). We
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where s:o:t:i:p: denotes second-order terms independent of policy. We can present equations (4) and (5)
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We take the second-order expansion of (8) and obtain the following relation:
b YH;t = ￿[￿ + (￿ ￿ !)￿] b PHT;t + !￿ b PNT;t + ￿ b Ct + !(1 ￿ ￿)d ERt + (1 ￿ ￿)b C￿
t + b gH;t (9)
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The second-order approximation of this equation yields the following expressions:
b YN;t = b Ct ￿ w(1 ￿ ￿)b PNT;t + b gN;t +
1
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NT;t￿ (12)
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Finally, the real exchange rate equation (12) approximated up to the second order takes the form:
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We combine constraints (6), (7), (10), (13), (15), and (17) in order to get rid of the linear terms in the
objective function (3). We collect vectors that contain the linear components of the above constraints and
derive the vector ￿, such that:
￿
ax bx cx dx ex fx
￿
￿ ￿ = zx
We solve the system of linear equations using the symbolic Matlab toolbox and derive values ￿1 ￿ ￿6
associated with each of the constraints. After the linear terms cancel, we obtain the following expression
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Vectors e Zx; e Z￿H; e Z￿N represent the weights next to the endogenous variables in the objective function.38 Yuliya Rychalovska
Furthermore, we would like to present the loss function (18) in terms of the variables b YN;t, b YH;t, d ERt,
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into the variables of interest with the use of matrices Q and Q￿ such that:
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where l = (￿￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿) and e l = l ￿ (￿! ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)￿: Therefore, the loss function (18) can
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Finally, we present the variables in the objective function in terms of the deviations from their target
values. Thus we denote the gap as e Xt = (Xt ￿ XT
t ). The target values are functions of the exogenous







: As a result, we are able to present the
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